Ghost Pipe — Industrial OT Brief
The problem with OT/IT data transfer is architectural, not operational.
OT networks cannot connect directly to cloud systems. VPNs create persistent attack surfaces. Legacy protocols (FTP, SMB, OPC-DA) are not quantum-safe. Sensor data in transit is being collected now for future decryption — the Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) threat. Ghost Pipe is a quantum-safe data conduit designed for the IEC 62443 zone boundary.A RAM-only relay for the DMZ zone boundary. No VPN. No network reconfiguration. No persistent storage. Sensor data enters encrypted, burns after delivery. The relay is a conduit, not a server.
Deployable on a Raspberry Pi 3B+ at the field level, or in your existing DMZ on any Linux server.
Not a SCADA historian. Not a VPN replacement for general traffic. Not a cloud service you depend on — the relay runs in your own infrastructure, under your own keys, and operates without external connectivity if needed.
Architecture & Deployment
The relay holds only ciphertext, only in RAM, only until delivered. It has no knowledge of sensor values, device identifiers, or process state. A full relay compromise yields zero plaintext.
/v2/did/registerdocker compose upSends one encrypted packet every 15 seconds. Each burns after the receiver reads it. Interval and TTL configurable.
Signs the firmware binary with ML-DSA-65, distributes to device group. Each device downloads once and the package burns.
Minimum hardware: Raspberry Pi 3B+ · 512 MB RAM · 4 GB SD · Ethernet. No display required. Connects to your DMZ network segment.
IEC 62443 Compliance Matrix
The table below maps IEC 62443-3-3 System Security Requirements to Ghost Pipe protocol properties. Documentation available at paramant.app/compliance/iec62443.
| Requirement | Title | Ghost Pipe implementation | SL-T |
|---|---|---|---|
| SR 4.1 | Information confidentiality | ML-KEM-768 client-side encryption. Relay never holds plaintext. Fixed-padding blobs — traffic analysis blind, SCADA message sizes not leaked. | 2–3 |
| SR 4.2 | Use control | API key per device (pgp_ end-user, plk_ operator). Device identity registration via /v2/did/register. Key revocation supported. Per-key audit trail. |
2–3 |
| SR 3.1 | Communication integrity | ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) Signed Tree Head after every Merkle root update. Inclusion proof per transfer — tamper detectable by any party, including independent auditors. | 2–3 |
| SR 2.8 | Auditable events | Public Certificate Transparency log at paramant.app/ct. Append-only, tamper-evident, publicly verifiable. Export to SIEM supported (JSON + CSV). Every transfer hash logged. | 2–3 |
| SR 5.2 | Zone boundary protection | Self-hosted relay deployed in DMZ. No persistent data crosses zone boundaries. No direct L2↔L3 connection required. Relay operates without external internet in air-gap mode. | 2–3 |
| SR 1.1 | Human user identification | Device enrollment via POST /v2/did/register with ECDH public key. DID (Decentralized Identifier) per device. Key rotation and revocation supported. |
2 |
| SR 1.2 | Software process identity | Device identity bound to ML-DSA-65 public key. Every transfer signed by the originating device. Identity not forgeable by the relay. | 2 |
| SR 2.1 | Authorisation enforcement | Per-key transfer quota and rate limiting. Plan-based access control (free / pro / enterprise). Relay rejects keys that exceed plan limits with HTTP 402/429. | 2 |
Note: Compliance documentation maps Ghost Pipe capabilities to IEC 62443 requirements. It is not a third-party certification. Customers seeking SL-T 3 certification should engage a certified IACS assessment body (e.g., TÜV, DNV) for formal verification.
Deployment & Pricing
| Payload | Relay (EU/DE managed) | Self-hosted LAN | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4 KB sensor packet | p50: ~80ms · p95: ~180ms | <10ms typical | Includes TLS + ML-KEM encapsulation |
| 64 KB config blob | p50: ~140ms · p95: ~320ms | <20ms typical | Single chunk, base64 encoded |
| 1 MB firmware chunk | p50: ~900ms · p95: ~2.1s | <80ms typical | 5 MB max on free tier |
| 5 MB max blob | p50: ~4.2s · p95: ~9s | <400ms typical | RAM limit per relay: 512 MB |
Benchmarks: EU sender/receiver pair, Hetzner Falkenstein relay, 100 Mbps uplink. Self-hosted LAN: 1 Gbps local network. Run paramant-benchmark.py to validate in your environment.
iot.paramant.app — Hetzner DE. Free evaluation: 1000 transfers / 30 days, no daily cap. Pro and Enterprise keys available.
No infrastructure required. Start evaluating in minutes.
Any Linux server. systemd unit included. Reverse proxy config for nginx/Caddy provided.
ARM64 native. 512 MB RAM min. Runs headless. Ideal for field-level DMZ segment.
Community self-hosted: BUSL-1.1 free forever, up to 5 users. Your server, your jurisdiction, your keys. No license required for evaluation.